BP's Statistical Review of World Energy for 2014 — for which analysts, policymakers and anyone trying to make sense of an extraordinary year on world oil markets had been impatiently awaiting — was released in June.

2014 was certainly a remarkable year. BP described it as one of "tectonic shifts," after what chief economist Spencer Dale called a period of "eerie calm" in recent years. While the supply-and-demand dynamics that have led to the collapsing prices are broadly understood, the statistics provided in this year's review add much flesh to the bones of those theories.

Dale proudly announced in a corporate video that respected oil guru Daniel Yergin carries in his suitcase only his passport and a copy of the BP Statistical Review. He is not the only one. I recently attended a presentation of the review by another of BP's senior economists, an environment lent extra energy by its taking place in Azerbaijan, an oil-dependent country feeling the bite of stubbornly low global prices.

As the economist highlighted, BP's review is the work of its economists, not its political advisors, and consequently aims for objectivity over speculation. The takeaways favor a focus on basic market fundamentals as a guide to the present and the future of the market, rather than conspiracy theories.

While economics cannot provide the full picture of an undeniably politicized industry, it is refreshing to see the basics laid down and stripped of suggestions that a group of five or six men sitting in a boardroom decides the future of the global oil market.

The economist did, however, note that any predictions made by the Statistical Review — and the Accompanying Energy Outlook for 2030 — are contingent on political factors. The elephant in the room, as always, is the question of whether Saudi Arabia will get fed up of waiting for the market to balance and finally cut output to bail out its OPEC colleagues.

The headlines were familiar: strong growth in non-OPEC supply and a regearing of the energy mix away from oil on the demand side, globally but most importantly in China. Add to this significant and ongoing gains in energy efficiency, and it soon becomes clear in which direction we are heading. Although some interesting microtrends were highlighted by the graphs and charts in our presentation.

Take the temporary recovery of oil prices in the first half of 2015, when the per-barrel price briefly hit $63 in February. This was a reaction to changes in the trajectory of the U.S. oil rig count, which showed the count "falling off a cliff." From this we can draw some important insights both for the psychology of the oil market and the unique structure of the shale revolution.

A fall in the rig count, an indicator closely followed as an indicator of future supply, was interpreted by the market as a signal that the market was in the process of rebalancing and boosted prices. However, the more fluid and responsive U.S. shale industry, unlike conventional oil elsewhere, can more easily "switch on and off" its rigs — indeed many shale rigs are built but held dormant until market signals change. This is not the case in the world's less flexible mega-projects.

Now that the U.S. is rapidly assuming the role of the world's new "swing producer," we can expect more rapid response to price signals and even a shift in traditional price patterns.

Indeed, perhaps the most interesting takeaway from the data is how it reflects on the unique nature of the U.S. as an oil-producing country. Even if the Saudis do cut output over the recent months, as their own reserves dwindle, it is possible that the best they an achieve is temporary relief for themselves and fellow OPEC members.

EIA data shows that OECD oil inventories rose from 57 days of supply to 63 between January and September 2015, and are projected to rise to a peak of 66 days in April 2016. That glut will take time to run down and will hold prices down.

That suggestion will bolster advocates of the U.S.'s alleged entrepreneur-friendly culture, reliant on the "creative destruction" of subpar firms, who will contend that the U.S. perhaps did not need to play any dirty games in Riyadh to dictate market prices. It merely needed to set free the innovation in its own oil and gas sector to balance prices in their favor.

Shale reserves are present in dozens of countries around the world, but the U.S. is unique in being able to successfully harness their power. Although in such unpredictable times, we should steer clear of triumphalism.

The question on everyone's lips is whether 2014 was a one-off or a sign of the "new normal" that all oil producers fear. BP's statistics suggest that, while one-off events like a mild winter in Europe had an impact on the severity of the price collapse, all of the other market signals suggest growth in the near future will be steady but minimal (although it is quite possible that we will see lower prices and serious volatility while the market balances over the next nine to 12 months).

It would be naive to ignore the impact of old-fashioned petro-politics, but the real story shown by BP's figures is shale, and that means innovation.