Oil and gas exports do not always flow through the fastest routes from producer nations to consumer markets. If they did, much Azerbaijani oil would likely be exported via Iran rather than across the Anatolian steppe via Turkey and Southeast Europe. Political risk and security considerations are a key factor in these decisions, which are as much about politics as economic efficiency.

Last week's attempted coup in Turkey will add more fuel to concerns over the country's increasingly important position as a global energy hub. Some speculate it may also open the door to Russian gas projects.

It is too early to assess the wider implications for energy routes of an attempted military takeover that seemingly no one predicted, and that the world is still struggling to fully understand. But Turkey is home to some of the most expensive, and strategic, pipeline routes for bringing oil and gas into Europe from the Middle East and Central Asia.

The BP-operated BTC pipeline from Baku to the southern port of Ceyhan carries 740,000 barrels per day (bpd). Oil from Iraq is also transported via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, and there are plans to incorporate Iraqi gas into the Southern Corridor project to carry gas to European markets via Turkey. The new $50 billion TANAP project, set to bring gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field to markets in Southeast Europe, is due for completion in 2018.

In addition, global energy flows are highly reliant not only on pipelines but also on shipping routes via Turkey and the Bosphorus Straits, through which 3 percent of all oil passes.

Operators were quick to reassure that none of these routes was significantly physically disrupted during the dramatic coup attempt, which was reflected in steady global oil prices that calmed fears of an immediate spike.

However, in the longer term, the nerves over Turkey's political direction (and its ongoing relations with both the European Union and the U.S.) will add to the existing uncertainty. Attacks on pipelines running through the country in the last year were attributed to Kurdish militant groups in the eastern part of the country, after a two-year ceasefire with the Turkish government broke down.

Some have suggested recent events could lead to a revival of the Turkish Stream project, an ambitious but stalled project that would deliver Russian gas to Europe via Turkey via a 63 bcm subsea pipeline under the Black Sea. Just days before the coup attempt, Russia and Turkey were rebuilding bridges after months of diplomatic standoffs, including more positive assessments of the viability of Turkish Stream.

Indeed, if Turkey's handling of the coup plotters leads to tensions in its relationship with the EU, we could see a further reconciliation of Turkish and Russian leaders. After all, despite long-standing historical tensions, the affinity between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan's illiberal leadership style and preference for "managed democracies" has been noted by many.

This would be a blow to EU and U.S. ambitions to diversify their energy supply routes away from an unpredictable Russia, a strategy in which Turkey is a key partner. It is difficult to overestimate the strategic value of stability in Turkey, given the wars raging on its southern borders and the breakdown of relationships between the West and Russia.

Depending on how developments unfold in Turkey, funders of energy infrastructure and European policymakers may begin to look at alternative options when sketching future routes. However, other than expensive LNG import options, the reality is that it will be tricky to find a route on the eastern borders of Europe that is not beset by political surprises like this one.